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[The President]... by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall
appoint... Judges of the supreme Court .... I
In the last six years, the President has nominated to the Supreme Court two
judges whose confirmation hearings in the Senate have rocked the nation. In
October 1987, after days of ideological warfare, 2 the Senate voted fifty-eight to
forty-two against the confirmation of Judge Robert H. Bork3-the greatest
margin of defeat ever of a candidate for the Supreme Court.4 In October 1991,
by the narrowest margin in U.S. history, the nomination of Judge Clarence
Thomas was confirmed by the Senate by a vote of fifty-two to forty-eight5 after
days of unseemly testimony surrounding accusations that the nominee had
sexually harassed Professor Anita Hill. But the controversy surrounding these
nominations was broader and deeper than the ideology or character of these
men, for questions concerning the role of the Senate in the Supreme Court
appointment process were as hotly debated as the final vote. What should the
Senate consider in determining whether a candidate is fit to be a Supreme Court
Justice? What is the Senate's constitutional role of "Advice and Consent"?
Given the facial indeterminateness of the Constitutional mandate and the
paucity of recorded debate surrounding its ratification, Senators have largely
defined their role for themselves. From the nation's founding to the present,
this self-definition has included the possibility that a nominee's ideology 6 may
* Former law clerk for Judge Nathaniel R. Jones of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit. A.B. Princeton University, 1987; Harvard Divinity School, 1987-88;
J.D. Yale Law School, 1992.1 U.S. CONST. art. If, § 2, cl. 2.
2 See, e.g., SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, REPORT ON THE NOMINATION OF
ROBERT H. BORK TO BE AN ASSOCIATE JUSTICE OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT,
EXEc. REPORT No. 7, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 226 (1987) [hereinafter BORK REPORT] (noting
that "politics and philosophical considerations were emphasized during the consideration of
this nomination").
3 133 CONG. REC. 29,121 (1987).
4 For outcomes of other nominations, see generally ELDER WrIT, GUIDE TO THE
SuPRimE COURT 995-98 (2d ed. 1990).
5 137 CONG. REC. S14,704-05 (daily ed. Oct. 15, 1991).
6 The term "ideology," used interchangeably with "politics" in this essay, is to be
distinguished from such notions as "judicial philosophy" and the like. Acknowledging some
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be properly considered grounds for rejection.7 Of the 143 nominations to the
Supreme Court, 27 (or approximately 19%) were rejected, withdrawn or
postponed. 8 Many of these failed nominations can be explained in terms of a
conceptual overlap of these terms, the former are meant to refer to opinions about the law
and public policy that are rooted in the general experience of living, see BENJAMIN N.
CARDoZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 14-18, 113-15 (1921) (describing how,
at times, judges are called upon to make law and policy as legislators do, calling upon their
life experiences), as opposed to those stemming from a specific understanding of the nature
of judging. Qf. Madeline Morris, The Grammar of Advice and Consent: Senate
Confinnation of Supreme Court Nominees, 38 DRAKE L. REv. 863, 874-75 (1989) (labeling
the former class of terms "substantive interpretation" and the latter "theory ofjudging").
7 This is hardly to imply that ideology is always considered or considered to be
decisive by Senators in casting their votes for or against a given nominee. Note, for
example, that Judge Antonin Scalia was confirmed by a vote of 98-0. 132 CONG. REC.
23,813 (1986). And, shortly after the Bork rejection, Judge Anthony M. Kennedy was
confirmed by a vote of 97-0. 134 CONG. REc. 483 (1988). Most recently, Judge Ruth Bader
Ginsburg breezed through the Senate by a vote of 96-3. 139 CONG. REc. S10,163 (daily ed.
Aug. 3, 1993).
Relevant to this issue, Donald R. Songer writes:
There appear to be two steps in the process of decision making used by most senators
in voting on Supreme Court nominations. First, each senator must decide whether the
nomination is a controversial one. If not, the senator is likely to feel compelled to vote
for confirmation regardless of his personal preferences or his private view of the merits
of the nomination. When a consensus exists that the nominee is not controversial, a
unanimous vote for confirmation will occur in spite of the fact that some senators may
privately prefer that the nominee not sit on the Court. However, a senator who
concludes that a nomination is controversial may then proceed to evaluate the merits of
the nomination, his own preferences, and relevant political factors before deciding
whether to vote for or against confirmation.
Donald R. Songer, The Relevance of Policy Values for the Confinnat'on of Supreme Court
Nominees, 13 LAW& Soc'yREv. 927, 929 (1979).
It is uncontroverted that the Senate may properly inquire into the "judicial fitness" of a
nominee, see, for example Morris, supra note 6, at 868-72, which concept may include
such notions as judicial competence, ethics, and temperament. While review of a nominee's
"theory of judging" may be less commonly accepted than "judicial fitness," see, for
example Morris, supra note 6, at 874-81, it is not nearly as controversial as Senatorial
forays into a nominee's ideology-the focus of this essay.
8 See HENRY J. ABRAHAM, JUSTICES AND PRESIDENTS: A POLricAL HISTORY OF
APPOINTMENTS TO THE SUPREME COURT 31 (1974). The successful nominations of Sandra
Day O'Connor, Antonin Scalia, Anthony M. Kennedy, David H. Souter, Clarence Thomas,
and Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and the failed nomination of Robert H. Bork, update the figures
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political power play on the part of the Senate.9 Other nominations, like that of
Clarence Thomas, were successful in spite of a politically galvanized Senate.10
This practice of considering the ideologies of Supreme Court nominees is
justifiable to the extent that it advances separation and balance of the powers of
the three branches of American government." Considering the broad discretion
a President has in choosing a nominee, coupled with the broad power of the
Supreme Court to decide to which direction the gray areas of the law will fade,
a President may well precipitate a political slant to American law that extends
decades beyond his or her term. 12 Senatorial consideration of the ideologies of
Supreme Court nominees serves to check this potential imbalance of power. 13
Such a broad rendering of the scope of the Senate's role finds support in the
text and history of Article II, Section 2, Clause 2 of the Constitution. 14
While the merits of considering a nominee's ideology have not gone
unnoticed, 15 the ramifications of such a political "Advice and Consent" role
have not been fully articulated. If a nominee's politics are properly reviewable,
cited in this work.
9 Songer statistically analyzed the 14 most "controversial" nominations of this century
(through 1979) and concluded that "Senate opposition to Supreme Court nominees is due
primarily to a predicted dissatisfaction with the policy-relevant voting of the nominee after
confirmation." Songer, supra note 7, at 945; accord JOSEPH P. HARMiS, THE ADVICE AND
CONSENT OF THE SENATE: A STUDY OF THE CONFIRMATION OF APPOINTMENTS BY THE
UNrrED STATES SENATE 305 (1953); Thomas Halper, Senate Rejection of Supreme Court
Nominees, 22 DRAKE L. REv. 102, 104 (1973); see also infra notes 18-64 and
accompanying text.
10 See infra notes 57-59 and accompanying text.
11 For a complete exposition of this argument, see infra notes 65-87 and
accompanying text.
12 C() ROBERT SCIGLIANO, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE PRESIDENCY 85 (1971).
13 See Larry W. Yackle, Choosing Judges the Democratic Way, 69 B.U. L.
REv. 273, 279-80 (1989).
14 See infra notes 88-107 and accompanying text.
15 See, e.g., LAURENCE H. TRIBE, GOD SAVE THIS HONORABLE COURT 113-21 (1985);
Charles L. Black, Jr., A Note on Senatorial Consideration of Supreme Court Nominees, 79
YALE L.J. 657, 657 (1970); Donald E. Lively, The Supreme Court Appointment Process: In
Search of Constitutional Roles and Responsibilities, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 551 (1986); Henry
Paul Monaghan, The Confirmation Process: Law or Politics?, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1202
(1988); Grover Rees III, Questions for Supreme Court Nominees at Confirmation Hearings:
Excluding the Constitution, 17 GA. L. REV. 913, 966 (1983); William G. Ross, The
Functions, Roles, and Duties of the Senate in the Supreme Court Appointment Process, 28
WM. & MARY L. Ray. 633 (1987); Scott R. Ryther, Note, Advice and Consent: 7he
Senate's Political Role in the Supreme Court Appointment Process, 1988 UTAH L. REV.
411.
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the House of Representatives ought to be involved in the confirmation
process. 16 Involvement by the House of Representatives would further the goal
of separating and balancing the powers of the branches of government and
would bring coherence to a process which, in the opinion of many, has gone
awry17
I.
The words of the Constitution I8 do not explicitly define what the Senate
may appropriately consider when voting upon a Supreme Court nomination.
Debates in the Federal Convention of 1787 (as well as those in the state
constitutional conventions thereafter) concerning the appointment of judges
were scanty and focused chiefly on who would nominate (viz., either the entire
Congress, the Senate, or the President) and whether a confirmation body was
necessary. There was little discussion of the appropriate factors to be taken into
consideration during the appointment process.19
Shortly after the Federal Convention, Alexander Hamilton wrote that the
Senate would generally play an accommodating role in the appointment
process,20 though the Senate admittedly "would be an excellent check upon a
spirit of favoritism in the President, and would tend greatly to prevent the
appointment of unfit characters from State prejudice, from family connection,
from personal attachment, or from a view to popularity." 2' This view is not
clearly representative of those who attended the Federal Convention, for
Hamilton had favored granting the appointment power to the President alone.22
Thus, he was perhaps more inclined to diminish the role of the Senate in the
appointment process to one of guarding against general incompetence and
cronyism than were those founders who had argued for legislative or even
shared appointment power. 23
16 For a full explication of this argument, see infra notes 108-24 and accompanying
text.
17 See, e.g., Stephen Carter, The Confirnmaion Mess, 101 HARv. L. REv. 1185
(1988).
18 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (quoted supra in text accompanying note 1).
19 See generally HARRIS, supra note 9, at 17-26. For a more complete discussion of
the debates in the Federal Convention of 1787 and how they may yet lend support to
ideological consideration of nominees, see infra notes 90-107 and accompanying text.
20 See THE FEDERALIST Nos. 66, 76 (Alexander Hamilton).
21 Id. No. 76, at 494 (Alexander Hamilton) (Modem Library College ed., 1964).
22 See generally HARRIS, supra note 9, at 19.
23 See infra notes 90-107 and accompanying text.
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President George Washington, the first to make a Supreme Court
nomination, bore witness to a certain ambiguity regarding the ambit of
Senatorial review when he wrote: "[A]s the President has a right to nominate
without assigning his reasons, so has the Senate a right to dissent without
giving theirs." 24 With little explicit guidance from the Constitution or early
debates, Senators have, from the beginning, defined for themselves the proper
scope of review. That a nominee's ideology may be included within this scope
was first evidenced during the Washington Administration.
In 1795, President Washington chose John Rutledge to replace Chief
Justice John Jay. Though Rutledge had served the Supreme Court as Associate
Justice from 1789 to 1791 before resigning to become Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court of South Carolina, his nomination to be Chief Justice of the
United States was nonetheless contested. Before receiving his nomination in
1795, Rutledge had spoken out against the Jay Treaty with Great Britain,
which was ratified by the Senate in that same year. The Federalists, staunch
supporters of the Jay Treaty, mobilized the Senate to reject the Rutledge
nomination by a vote of fourteen to ten.25 Thomas Jefferson wrote: "The
rejection of Mr. Rutledge by the Senate is a bold thing, because they cannot
pretend any objection to him but his disapprobation of the treaty. It is, of
course, a declaration that they will receive none but Tories hereafter into any
Department of the Government." 26
There were also allegations at the time that Rutledge was becoming
insane-perhaps related to the viewpoint of zealous Federalists that only a
crazy person would oppose the treaty.27 One commentator concludes, however,
that "[b]ut for his unfortunate . . . speech [against the Jay Treaty] he would
undoubtedly have been confirmed, despite the rumor as to his mental
condition." 28
Of all politically oriented groups, the Federalists (like Alexander Hamilton)
voiced the strongest support for a strong executive and a limited role of the
Senate in the appointment process during the federal and state constitutional
24 30 THE WRriNGs oF GEORGE WASHINGTON FROM THE OmGINAL MANUSCRT
SouRcEs, 1745-99, at 374 (John C. Fitzpatrick ed., 1939) (quoting from Washington's
diary dated Aug. 8, 1789).
25 See generally ABRAHAM, supra note 8, at 33; HARRIS, supra note 9, at 42-43;
CHARLES WARREN, 1 THE SUPREME COURT IN UNrrED STATES HISTORY 124-39 (1926).
26 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to William B. Giles (Dec. 31, 1795), in 9 THE
WRITINGS oFTHOMAS JEFFERSON 318 (Albert Ellery Bergh ed., 1907).
27 See HARRIS, supra note 9, at 43; WARREN, supra note 25, at 131.
28 WARREN, supra note 25, at 139. But see John 0. McGinnis, The President, the
Senate, the Constitution, and the Confinnation Process: A Reply to Professors Strauss and
Sunstein, 71 TEX. L. REV. 633, 654-55 (1993).
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conventions. 29 Yet within a decade of the ratification of the Constitution, even
those who would seemingly be most likely to disapprove of Senatorial
consideration of a nominee's politics were actively opposing a nomination on
such grounds.
Political considerations also factored into the nascent Senate's rejection of
Alexander Wolcott in 1811. Wolcott, nominated to the Supreme Court by
President James Madison, had previously served as a customs collector in
Connecticut, where he enforced the Embargo and Non-Intercourse laws with
vim and vigor. As was the case with Rutledge, the Federalists in the Senate
strongly disapproved of Wolcott's political stance and successfully defeated the
Wolcott nomination by a vote of twenty-four to nine.30 There were also
concerns about Wolcott's professional qualifications, 31 though they may well
have been smokescreens for political opposition. 32 In sum, there is evidence
that from the outset the Senate has understood it to be proper to consider the
politics of Supreme Court nominees.
Many subsequent Supreme Court nominations faced opposition from
Senators hostile to the politics of the nominees, as the following brief survey
indicates.
President Andrew Jackson's nomination of Roger Brooke Taney in 1835
encountered fierce political opposition. As Secretary of the Treasury, Taney
had fully approved of and implemented Jackson's order that all government
deposits be removed from the Bank of the United States. Though the Whigs in
the Senate strongly disapproved of this dismantling of the federal bank system
and opposed the Taney nomination, the Senate voted to confirm by a vote of
twenty-nine to fifteen in 1836.3 3
President James K. Polk's 1845 nomination of George W. Woodward was
opposed in part due to the phenomenon of "Senatorial courtesy," 34 and in large
part because of his "gross nativist American sentiments" not to be found
29 See supra notes 20-22 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 90-107 and
accompanying text.
30 See generally ABRAHAM, supra note 8, at 33; HARRIS, supra note 9, at 50;
WARREN, supra note 25, at 410-13; Paul A. Freund, Appointment of Justices: Some
Historical Perspectives, 101 HARv. L. REv. 1146, 1148 (1988).
31 See HARRIS, supra note 9, at 50.
32 WARREN, supra note 25, at 412. For a general discussion of the use by Senators of
more commonly acceptable reasons as a cover for less commonly acceptable ones, see infra
note 63 and accompanying text.
33 See generally ABRAHAM, supra note 8, at 90-92.
34 See infra note 62.
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among the majority of Senators.35 His bid was defeated by a vote of twenty-
nine to twenty.36
In 1916, the nomination of Louis D. Brandeis by President Woodrow
Wilson sparked controversy that ran down party lines. 37 While the nominee's
social and economic views resonated with those of Democratic and Progressive
Senators, Republican Senators opposed them.38 Brandeis's social and economic
views were not the only factors considered by Senators. Questions concerning
his character and judicial temperament were raised, but may have been facades
for ideological opposition. 39 Ultimately, only one Democratic or Progressive
Senator broke ranks with his party, and the Republicans were uniform in their
opposition. Brandeis was confirmed by a vote of forty-seven to twenty-two. 40
Similarly, the nomination of Charles Evans Hughes by President Herbert
C. Hoover in 1930 brought forth frank ideological opposition. Although liberal
Senators contested the nomination because of the nominee's close association
with big business, 41 Hughes was eventually confirmed as Chief Justice by a
vote of fifty-two to twenty-six.42
Later that same year, the Senate rejected John J. Parker, another Hoover
nominee. While the nominee was attacked on many fronts, opposition to his
ideology focused on labor and race issues. He was sharply criticized by liberals
as anti-union for upholding a "yellow dog contract" (i.e., one which requires
employees to refrain from joining any union as a condition of employment) as a
Fourth Circuit judge. In addition, he was castigated for the following statement
he made while running for Governor of North Carolina in 1920:
The Negro as a class does not desire to enter politics. The Republican Party of
North Carolina does not desire him to do so. We recognize the fact that he has
not yet reached that stage in his development when he can share the burdens
and responsibilities of government. . . . The participation of the Negro in
35 See generally ABRAHAM, supra note 8, at 33-34.
36 Id.
37 Not all ideological opposition to a nominee is associated with partisan politics. See
Songer, supra note 7, at 946 (summarizing a part of his statistical analysis, the author
concludes that "[p]artisan motives may play some part, especially in increasing support for
the President's party, but it was shown that the relationship of policy views to confirmation
votes was independent of party").
38 See HARRIS, supra note 9, at 99-114; Freund, supra note 30, at 1151-53. See
generally A.L. TODD, JUSTICE ON TRIAL: THE CASE OF LOUIS D. BRANDEIS (1964).
39 See Freund, supra note 30, at 1151.
40 See HARRIS, supra note 9, at 113; Freund, supra note 30, at 1152.
41 See generally ALPHEUS T. MASON, THE SUPREME COURT FROM TAFT TO WARREN
73 (1958).
42 See Songer, supra note 7, at 930.
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politics is a source of evil and danger to both races and is not desired by the
wise men in either race or by the Republican Party of North Carolina. 43
Parker was defeated by the margin of forty-one to thirty-nine. 44
The perceived liberal ideology of Abe Fortas was one factor leading to his
failure to obtain the position of Chief Justice.45 Nominated by President
Lyndon B. Johnson in 1968 to replace Chief Justice Earl Warren, Fortas asked
that his nomination be withdrawn after a filibuster by conservative Senators. 46
Two nominees of President Richard M. Nixon were rejected at least
partially for ideological reasons. 47 Judge Clement Haynsworth, Jr., nominated
in 1969, was opposed in part for being allegedly anti-union and in part for
alleged conservatism on race issues. 48 While ethical improprieties were raised,
scholars have suggested that these improprieties might not have been uncovered
but for the diligence of "those who sought to block the nomination for political
reasons." 49 His nomination was defeated by a fifty-five to forty-five vote.50
Nominated by Nixon in 1970, G. Harold Carswell was criticized in the
Senate for his record of advocating white supremacy. His qualifications were
also called into question. As one scholar concludes, however, "[d]espite the
many questions about Judge Carswell's abilities, his lack of intellectual
distinction probably would not have been fatal if serious doubt had not also
been raised about his commitment to racial justice." 51 Carswell's nomination
was rejected by a vote of fifty-one to forty-five.52
The recent nominations of William H. Rehnquist, Robert H. Bork, and
Clarence Thomas were contested at least partly for ideological reasons. In
43 Rona M. Mendelsohn, Senate Confinnation of Suprene Court Appointments: The
Nomination and Rejection of John J. Parker, 14 How. L.J. 105, 122 (1968) (quoting W.T.
Bost, Republicans Happy in Progress of Negroes to Democratic Party, GREENSBORO DAILY
NEws, Apr. 19, 1920, at 1).
44 See generally ABRAHAM, supra note 8, at 34-35; Freund, supra note 30, at 1154-
55; Lively, supra note 15, at 567-72.
45 See generally ABRAHAM, supra note 8, at 265-66; see also infra notes 60-63 and
accompanying text.
46 See ABRAHAM, supra note 8, at 266.
47 See A. Mitchell McConnell, Jr., Haynsworth and Carswell: A New Senate Standard
of Excellence, 59 KY. L.J. 7, 20-24 (1970); Ross, supra note 15, at 645-48.
48 See generally Joel B. Grossman & Stephen L. Wasby, 7he Senate and Supreme
Court Nominations: Some Reflections, 1972 DuKE L.J. 557, 570.
49 Id. at 577.
50 See McConnell, supra note 47, at 20.
51 Ross, supra note 15, at 89.
52 See Songer, supra note 7, at 930.
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1986, Rehnquist was nominated to be elevated to Chief Justice. Voicing the
opposition of liberal Senators to Rehnquist's conservative ideology, Democratic
Senator Dennis DeConcini bluntly maintained, "Let us not kid ourselves. This
is not an issue about a restriction in a deed or about supposedly challenging
voters. This is an issue of whether or not a very conservative sitting Justice
should be moved to the position of Chief Justice." 53 By a vote of sixty-five to
thirty-three, the nomination was approved.54
Judge Robert H. Bork was nominated to be an Associate Justice of the
Supreme Court by President Ronald W. Reagan in 1987. This nomination
produced perhaps the stormiest confirmation debate to that time, much of
which had an ideological bent. Senator Edward Kennedy summed up the liberal
opposition to the nominee in frank terms:
No one disputes the President's right to try to force [a] tilt on the Supreme
Court-and no one should dispute the right of the Senate to try to stop him.
That's what advice and consent means in the Constitution.... [W]hat is sauce
for the goose is sauce for the gander. President Reagan obviously took Judge
Bork's ideology into account in making the nomination, and the Senate has
every right to take it into account in acting on the nomination. 55
Bork was defeated by a wide margin, fifty-eight to forty-two. 56
Judge Clarence Thomas was nominated by President George H.W. Bush in
1991. While initial political skirmishes were fought on the sidelines,
accusations of sexual harassment against the nominee turned the nomination
into the most controversial one in American history. The confirmation hearings
and debates became the battlegrounds of an outright political war. On his way
toward casting his vote against the nominee, the Democratic Majority Leader,
Senator George Mitchell, suggested that Thomas's ideology as it related to
abortion was to be given serious consideration:
In 1980, the Republican National Convention adopted a platform which
called for the appointment of judges committed to the pro-life position on
abortion.
Since 1980, in honoring that commitment, Presidents Reagan and Bush
53 132 CONG. REc. 23,788 (1986) (statement of Sen. DeConcini).
54 See WrT, supra note 4, at 998.
55 133 CONG. REC. 28,695 (1987) (statement of Sen. Kennedy). This sentiment was
echoed on the other side of the Capitol by Representative Major Owens of New York, who
stated that "since Bork's ideology and philosophy is the reason for his being nominated to
the high Court, it must also be the reason to turn down his nomination." 139 CONG. REc.
23,916 (1987) (statement of Rep. Owens).
56 133 CONG. REc. 29,121 (1987).
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have established as a litmus test for a potential nominee to the Supreme Court
that person's position on abortion.
The President opposes a woman's right of choice. In order to have any
hope of being nominated to the Supreme Court, so must any potential
nominee.
The President selects nominees because of the views, not despite them.
That is his privilege....
By the same token, the Senate is not required to rubber stamp a
nomination simply because it has been made by a President.
It is illogical and untenable to suggest that the President has the right to
select someone because of that person's views and then to say the Senate has no
right to reject that person because of those very same views.57
Senator Kennedy crisply stated: "[I]t is clear that Judge Thomas was nominated
precisely to advance the agenda of the right wing. I oppose any effort by this
administration to pack the Supreme Court.... "58 Thomas was confirmed by
a vote of only fifty-two to forty-eight.59
At times, Senators have directed their political attacks toward a President
of the rival political party. For example, when the liberal Fortas was nominated
to be Chief Justice in June 1968, nineteen Republican Senators signed the
following statement:
It is the strongly held view of the undersigned that the next Chief Justice
of the United States, and any nominees for the vacancies of the Supreme Court
should be selected by the newly elected President of the United States, after the
people have expressed themselves in November's elections.
We will, therefore, because of the above principle, and with absolutely no
reflection on any individuals involved, vote against confirming any Supreme
Court nominations of the incumbent President. 60
As noted above, the political opposition to Johnson's nominee succeeded. 61
Whether directed toward the nominee, the President, 62 or both, it is clear that
57 137 CONG. REc. S14,703 (daily ed. Oct. 15, 1991) (statement of Sen. Mitchell)
(emphasis added).
58 137 CONG. REC. S14,641 (daily ed. Oct. 15, 1991) (statement of Sen. Kennedy).
59 137 CONG. REc. S14,704-05 (daily ed. Oct. 15, 1991).
60 137 CONG. REC. S14,702 (daily ed. Oct. 15, 1991) (statement of Sen. Mitchell)
(quoting the 1968 decree).
61 See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
62 At times, Senate opposition to a President's nominee may not stem from ideological
factors per se. For example, the phenomenon of "senatorial courtesy" factored heavily into
the rejections of several nineteenth century candidates. Both William B. Horblower and
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ideological factors have been considered in the Senate's review of Supreme
Court candidates.
Often, consideration of a nominee's ideology is not overt. Ideological
reasons for rejecting a nominee may be masked by stated reasons that are more
"objective" in nature and thus more commonly acceptable. 63
Senators may disapprove of considering a Supreme Court nominee's
ideology. Many if not most have voiced such disapproval. 64 The fact remains,
however, that Senators throughout this nation's history have deemed
ideological factors relevant in deciding the fate of a candidate's nomination.
Thus, there appears to be a tension in the historical record, even to this day,
between theory and praxis. The tension may be resolved by a closer
examination of the theory.
Wheeler H. Peckham, two New Yorkers nominated by President Grover Cleveland to
replace New Yorker Samuel Blatchford in 1893 and 1894, respectively, were rejected
principally because the President had ignored the alternative suggestions of the highly
influential Senator David B. Ill from New York. Reuben H. Walworth, nominated by
President Tyler in 1844, and George W. Woodward, nominated by President Polk in 1845,
may have also suffered the slings and arrows of Senatorial discourtesy en route to the
rejection of their nominations. See generally ABRAHAM, supra note 8, at 18.
63 See generally Lively, supra note 15, at 575 (arguing that the appointment process
"truly is demeaned not when the Senate focuses upon values and ideology, but when it does
so and pretends that it has not"); McConnell, supra note 47, at 13 ("A pattern emerges
running from Rutledge and Taney through Brandeis and Parker up to and including
Haynsworth and Carswell in which the Senate has employed deception to achieve its
partisan goals. The deception has been to ostensibly object to a nominee's fitness while in
fact the opposition is born of political expedience."); Ross, supra note 15, at 649-51 (noting
that concerns about "ethical fitness" and "judicial temperament" are often smokescreens for
ideologically based grounds for opposition).
For specific instances of Senators masking real objections to a nominee, see, for
example WARREN, supra note 25, at 412 (commenting that attacks upon the morals and
abilities of Wolcott were "in fact due to Wolcott's vigorous enforcement of the Embargo
and Non-Intercourse laws"); Freund, supra note 30, at 1151 (maintaining that in the case of
Brandeis "[t]he opposition couched its attack in terms of questionable character and lack of
judicial temperament, and occasionally anti-Semitism became overt, but essentially the
campaign against the nominee rested on the repugnance of his social and economic views");
Grossman & Wasby, supra note 48, at 354 (arguing that voiced ethics objections to
Haynsworth masked ideologically based objections); Lively, supra note 15, at 575, 577
(suggesting that opposition to Haynsworth on ethical grounds was a facade for "ideological
or political considerations").
64 See, e.g., BORK REPORT, supra note 2, at 226 (stating that though ideology was
considered during the confirmation hearings, it should not be considered when it comes
time to vote); see also 133 CoNG. REc. 28,677 (1987) (statement of Sen. Hatch).
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Io.
The practice of senatorial review of a Supreme Court nominee's ideology
is constitutionally appropriate inasmuch as it serves to maintain the separation
and balance of power among the three branches of American government.
Because and insofar as ideology may affect the outcome of judicial decisions, a
President's political agenda may be advanced well in excess of his or her tenure
by appointing an ideological soul mate to the nation's highest bench. Active
probing of a nominee's ideology on the part of the Senate serves to check this
potentially destabilizing eventuality.
The Constitution does not limit the ideological range of persons a President
may nominate to the Supreme Court. Presidents from George Washington to
George H.W. Bush seemed to have sought nominees with ideologies similar to
their own on key issues of the day. President Washington generally insisted on
nominating men with strong Federalist leanings, 65 as did President John
Adams, who nominated John Marshall as Chief Justice.66 President Ulysses S.
Grant, a vigorous proponent of paper currency, was able to appoint two
Justices who tipped the balance of the Supreme Court from its prior ruling that
Congress could not issue paper money to a ruling upholding the Legal Tender
Act as a proper exercise of war powers. 67 Both President Benjamin Harrison
and President Grover Cleveland appointed individuals who were likely to
uphold the interests of big business in the name of economic liberty.68
President William Howard Taft is also believed to have screened potential
nominees with regard to their conformance to his strongly held views on
economic liberty; in fact, one of Taft's appointees, Justice Willis Van
Devanter, provided a critical vote in striking down President Franklin D.
Roosevelt's New Deal legislation-twenty-five years after his appointment.69
President Roosevelt himself, with his threatened Court-packing scheme,
provided perhaps the most blatant example of a President seeking to create a
Court that would mirror his own political concerns.
More recently, the Reagan Administration reportedly engaged in intense
65 See ABRAHAM, supra note 8, at 64-71 (noting that Washington's 10 Federalist
appointees rendered "[p]ractically no anti-Federalist decisions [or] what could be called an
anti-Federalist dissenting opinion").
66 See id. at 72 (commenting that Adams's three appointees-Bushrod Washington,
Alfred Moore, and John Marshall-were all established Federalists).
67 See LEO PFEFER, THis HONORABLE COURT 182-85 (1965).
68 See Lively, supra note 15, at 558.
69 See HERBERT JACOB, LAW, PoLrrIcs AND THE FEDERAL COURTS 72-87 (1967);
MASON, supra note 41, at 67.
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screening of candidates to ensure a choice of nominees who would promote and
safeguard the Administration's ideological goals.70 In the words of judicial
appointments expert Sheldon Goldman, "I think there has been more consistent
ideological screening under Reagan than any Administration since
Roosevelt.... Certainly, it is not a rational use of the appointment process to
select people who are going to sabotage their agenda." 71 Among ideological
issues, abortion certainly ranked high. The 1980 and 1984 Republican
platforms called on the President to appoint "judges at all levels of the judiciary
who respect traditional family values and the sanctity of innocent human life"-
the latter requirement commonly understood to be opposition to abortion. 72
Once appointed, the politics of a sitting Justice may creep into and
influence his or her opinion even when faced with an application of clearly
defined law to a set of facts. 73 Justices who approach cases as "objectively" as
possible are not immune to more "subjective" impulses. Consider the
reflections of Benjamin Cardozo:
There has been a certain lack of candor in much of the discussion... or rather
perhaps in the refusal to discuss it, as if judges must lose respect and
confidence by the reminder that they are subject to human limitations. I do not
doubt the grandeur of the conception which lifts them into the realm of pure
reason, above and beyond the sweep of perturbing and deflecting forces. None
the less, if there is anything of reality in my analysis of the judicial process,
70 Lively, supra note 15, at 561 & n.54.
71 Ronald Brownstein, With or Without Supreme Court Changes, Reagan Will Reshape
the Federal Bench, 49 NAT'LJ. 2338, 2340 (1984).
72 See id.; see also 137 CONG. REC. S14,703 (daily ed. Oct. 15, 1991) (statement of
Sen. Mitchell) (accusing President Bush of the same type of ideological screening see supra
text accompanying note 57); John Hart Ely, Another Such Victory: Constitutional Theory
and Practice in a World Where Courts Are No Different from Legislatures, 77 VA. L. Rnv.
833, 844 (1991). One rendering of this screening process was given by Yale Law School
students in a humorous skit performed in May 1992, which contained the words (fictitiously
attributed to President Bush and sung to the tune of Michael Jackson's "Black or White"):
Had a chance to fill Thurgood's seat,
My chance to finalize the liberal's defeat,
And I thought about equality-
Did not make this decision by sight;
Said as long as you oppose abortion
It don't matter if you're black or white.
73 It should be emphasized that this is not a normative but a descriptive
statement.
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they do not stand aloof on these chill and distant heights; and we shall not help
the cause of truth by acting and speaking as if they do. The great tides and
currents which engulf the rest of man, do not turn aside in their course, and
pass the judges by.7 4
Undoubtedly, the "sweep of perturbing and deflecting forces" is felt to an
even greater degree when a Justice is faced with a situation in which the state
of the law is unclear, or involves a balancing test.75 The balancing tests
fashioned by the Court to resolve multifarious controversies cannot be
employed mechanically. Subjective opinions derived from a Justice's "whole
outlook on life"76 affect the tilt of the balance. 77 At times, the factors in the
balance may be objective, so that only the weighting process is subjective. At
other times, however, the factors themselves are open to differing views among
reasonable persons. In short, when deciding issues of this type, "five Justices
of the Supreme Court are molders of policy, rather than impersonal vehicles of
revealed truth." 78 Because a Supreme Court Justice sits "during good
Behaviour," 79 she or he may tint the ideological color of the law well in excess
of the term of the appointing President.
Given the long-reaching effects of a Supreme Court appointment, the
Senate ought to consider the ideology of a Supreme Court nominee in order to
maintain the separation and balance of powers among the branches of
government. The framers of the Constitution took great pains to provide a
system of checks and balances among the three branches of government-
legislative, executive, and judicial. This "basic concept"80 of American
government, "admitted on all hands to be essential to the preservation of
7 4 CARDozo, supra note 6, at 167-68.
75 Cf. id. at 14-18 (maintaining that when there are no objective factors to be relied
upon, the law which is the resulting product is not found, but made).
76 FELIX FRANKFURTER, The Supreme Court and the Public, in FELIX FRANKFURTER
ON THE SUPREME COURT 218 (Philip Kurland ed., 1970).
77 See CARDOzo, supra note 6, at 113, 115 ("If you ask how [the judge] is to know
when one interest outweighs another, I can only answer that he must get his knowledge just
as the legislator gets it, from experience and study and reflection; in brief, from life
itself.... The process, being legislative, demands the legislator's wisdom.").
78 Felix Frankfurter, 77e Supreme Court and tize Public, 83 FORuM 329, 334 (1930);
see also Ryther, supra note 15, at 425-26 (arguing that both legal realists and legal
positivists must agree that judges are in the business of legislation at least some of the time).
See generally MARTIN SHAPIRo, LAW AND PoLrrIcs IN THE SUPREME COURT: Nmv
APPROACHES TO POLrIcAL JUmISPRUDENCE (1964).
79 U.S. CONST. art. Ill, § 1.80 United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 704 (1974).
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liberty,"81 provides that, inter alia: the President may veto legislation;82
Congress may override such a veto;83 and the Supreme Court may strike down
legislation considered unconstitutional. 84 If a President is able to appoint a
Supreme Court Justice whose ideology is similar to his or her own, without
ideology-related Senate scrutiny, the delicate balance of these powers may be
upset. On matters ranging from the constitutionality of legislation to the
authorization of power in the gray areas between the Chief Executive and the
Legislature, 85 the Supreme Court may tip the balance in the President's
direction. A straightforward review of the ideology of a Supreme Court
nominee is thus an essential component of the Senate's advice and consent role.
In the words of James Madison, "power is of an encroaching nature, and ought
to be effectually restrained from passing the limits assigned to it." 86
The text of the Appointments Clause as well as a close examination of its
origin support a coequal role of the Senate in appointing Supreme Court
Justices. The plain meaning of the phrase chosen to describe the Senate's role,
"by and with the Advice and Consent .. "87 seems to connote active
participation by the Senate. The Senate is to give advice88 and is not
constrained with regard to the scope of that advice. A liberal Senate would be
likely to advise against a President appointing a person with a conservative
81 THE F-DERALIST No. 51, at 336 (Alexander Hamilton or James Madison) (Modem
Library College ed., 1964); see also id. Nos. 47-48 (James Madison), No. 49 (Alexander
Hamilton or James Madison) (detailing the roots of this concept in Montesquieu and
discussing how the Constitution ensures that each branch is sufficiently disconnected from
the others as to be separate from them, but sufficiently connected to them to be checked by
them).
82 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7.
83 Id.
84 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
85 See, e.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
86 THE FE-DERALIST No. 48, at 321 (James Madison) (Modem Library College ed.,
1964).
87 U.S. CONST. art. ]I, § 2, cl. 2.
88 On a few occasions, the President did indeed receive advice about whom to
nominate. For example, Edwin Stanton was nominated by President Ulysses S. Grant in
response to a petition that was signed by a majority of the House and Senate. Grant heeded
the advice in an effort to obtain Senate support for the pending nomination of Ebenezer R.
Hoar. See ABRAHAM, supra note 8, at 118.
President Herbert C. Hoover was advised by the Chairman of the Senate Judiciary
Committee, Senator George W. Norris, to nominate a judicial liberal to replace the retiring
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. Benjamin N. Cardozo was nominated and approved
without discussion or roll call in the Senate. See id. at 191.
See also supra note 62.
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ideology to the Supreme Court. By subjecting a nominee to ideological scrutiny
after the nomination is made, the Senate gives, perhaps belatedly but no less
effectively, its advice.89
A review of the debates surrounding the appointment of judges at the
Federal Convention of 1787 also supports the view of an active Senatorial role
in the Supreme Court appointment process. The Appointments Clause is best
viewed as a compromise between those who favored independent executive
power to appoint and those who favored independent legislative power to
appoint. Such a compromise has implications regarding the scope of Senatorial
review.
The first proposal to be considered at the Convention, put forward on June
5, 1787, called for "the national Judiciary [to] be chosen by the National
Legislature." 90 Those opposing this proposal either sought to vest the executive
with independent appointment power in order to avoid the "[i]ntrigue, partiality
and concealment" claimed to be inherent in nominations by numerous bodies, 91
or would have given the appointment power to the Senate, for it was "not so
numerous as to be governed by the motives of the other branch," 92 and
Senators were "sufficiently stable and independent to follow their deliberate
judgments." 93 No agreement was reached on this matter at the Convention at
that time.94
On June 13, the Convention adopted a proposal by James Madison to give
independent appointment power to the Senate.95 Madison reiterated his
opposition to involvement by the House of Representatives as he felt they were
"incompetent Judges of the requisite qualifications" of judges and would be
89 See Black, supra note 15, at 658-59; see also TRBE, supra note 15, at 9.
90 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 119 (Max Farrand ed.,
1966) [hereinafter 1 RECORDS]. This may be seen as a logical extension of Article IX of the
Articles of Confederation, which stated that the "united states in congress assembled shall
also be the last resort on appeal in all disputes and differences now subsisting or that
hereafter may arise between two or more states concerning boundary, jurisdiction or any
other cause whatever. . . ." ARTS. OF CONFED. OF 1781, reprinted in DOCUMENTS
ILLUSTRATIVE OF THE FORMATION OF THE UNION OF THE AMERICAN STATES 31 (Charles C.
Tansill ed., 1927). The legislature was authorized to choose judges to hear such matters if
the parties could not agree upon judges themselves. Id. at 31-32.
91 JAMEs MADISON, NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 67
(1976). Another delegate, James Wilson of Pennsylvania, propounded such a view. See
generally HARRIS, supra note 9, at 18.
92 MADISON, supra note 91, at 68 (noting that Madison advanced this argument).
93 Id.
94 Id.
95 1 RECORDS, supra note 90, at 233.
[Vol. 54:10871102
ADVICE AND CONSENT
partial toward those "who had displayed a talent for business in the legislative
field, who perhaps assisted ignorant members in business of their own, or of
their Constituents, or used other winning means." 96
The issue was next debated on July 18. Nathaniel Gorham of
Massachusetts proposed that "the Judges be nominated and appointed by the
Executive, by [and] with the advice [and] consent of the [Senate]," 97 as was the
procedure according to the Constitution of Massachusetts. This proposal was
opposed on one side by delegates who favored independent executive power,
and on the other by those, like Roger Sherman, who favored independent
Senate appointment because it was "composed of men nearly equal to the
Executive, and would of course have on the whole more wisdom. They would
bring to their deliberations a more diffusive knowledge of characters." 98
Similar to the concerns voiced by James Wilson apropos the legislature,99
Roger Sherman expressed concern that the executive would be too vulnerable to
intrigue. 1°° A motion to amend the June 13 proposal was defeated. 101
On July 21, the Convention debated a second proposal put forward by
James Madison that "the Executive [should nominate, and] such nominations
become appointments unless disagreed to by [two-thirds] of the [Senate]." 10 2
According to Madison, the President would better take the concerns of the
country into account, while the Senate would consider chiefly state interests. 03
During this session of the debates, Oliver Ellsworth of Connecticut argued that
this proposal would give too much power to the executive, which would "be
more open to caresses [and] intrigues than the Senate."' 0 4 Edmund Randolph
disagreed, believing more intrigue to lie with the Senate.10 5 Madison's second
proposal was defeated, even after the two-thirds provision was changed to one-
half.
The matter was finally resolved with the report of the Special Committee
on Postponed Matters on September 4. The relevant provision of the report
read: "[The President] shall nominate and by and with the advice and consent
96 MADISON, supra note 91, at 112-13.
97 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONvENTION OF 1787, at 44 (Max Farrand ed.,
1966) [hereinafter 2 REcoRDs].
98 MADISON, supra note 91, at 316.
99 See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
100 Id.
101 2 RECORDS, supra note 97, at 43.
102 Id. at 80.
103 MADISON, supra note 91, at 344. The majority of Senators at the time came from
Northern states; Madison was from Virginia.
104 1d. at 345.
105 Id. at 344.
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of the Senate shall appoint. . .Judges of the supreme Court." 106 After little
further substantive debate, this final proposal was adopted on September 7.
From these debates, it is clear that a compromise was reached between
those who favored appointment solely by the Executive and those who would
have placed this power completely within the realm of the legislative branch.
Opinions differed sharply as to which entity would be more susceptible to
"intrigue" and the like. It is difficult to assert that the Senate should serve as a
mere "rubber stamp" to the nominations of the President from this record.
Instead, an active, coequal role of the Senate may be implied from the type of
compromise reached. 10 7
HIf.
Senate confirmation votes have turned on the ideologies of Supreme Court
nominees. Arguing that this past practice is properly within the scope of the
Senate's advice and consent role, some commentators have called for more
consistent and open consideration of a nominee's ideology.' 08 One scholar, for
example, arguing for increased consideration of ideological factors and
lamenting Senatorial acquiescence in the President's choices of nominees,
writes:
Lost in the course of deferential review is the opportunity for input on a
momentous decision from a maximum number of sources. Presumably, the
more voices heard and the more concerns heeded, the wiser the ultimate
decision will be. . . . [U]nlike the president, the Senate better reflects the
diversity of the populace and thus of the interests affected by an
appointment. 109
10 6 Id. at 575.
107 See PFEFFER, supra note 67, at 22; Black, supra note 15, at 661.
108 See supra note 15. But see, e.g., 133 CONG. REc. 28,677 (1987) (statement of Sen.
Hatch) ("Federal judges are not politicians and ought not to be judged like politicians. The
great danger I see in the impending ideological inquisition is injury to the independence and
integrity of the Federal judiciary. When we undertake to judge a judge according to
political, rather than legal criteria, we have stripped the judicial office of all that makes it a
distinct separated power."); Letter from Richard M. Nixon to William Saxbe (Mar. 31,
1970), reprinted in 116 CONG. REc. 10,158 (1970) (maintaining that because the President
has the "power of appointment," the Senate should not substitute its "subjective judgment"
for that of the President, and commenting that his immediate predecessors were "freely
accorded" this "right of choice").
109 Lively, supra note 15, at 576.
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Presupposing the Supreme Court appointment process properly to have a
political aspect in order to preserve separation and balance of powers, it is
indeed appropriate to argue for maximum representation of the populace in the
process. To the extent that ideology affects the outcomes of constitutional
conundrums affecting the People, that ideology should reflect that of the
People. When it does not, the institution of judicial review exists in tension
with ongoing representative democratic government.110 This tension is, at
times, appropriate to counter codified waves of public opinion that stray from
the Constitution.' 1 ' When ideology influences outcome, however, the judiciary
is not a check upon, but a substitution for, the judgment of the People. The
overriding constitutional principle of a nation of the People, by the People, for
the People is thereby undermined. Increasing the political aspect of advice and
consent in the appointment process to better reflect the diverse views of the
citizenry would serve to minimize this "countermajoritarian difficulty."' 12
If the Senate's consideration and appraisal of a Supreme Court nominee's
ideology is appropriate to resolve the countermajoritarian difficulty, the House
of Representatives ought to be involved in the appointment process as well. The
House "better reflects the diversity of the populace and thus of the interests
affected by an appointment"" 3 than the Senate alone. If the Senate should be
called upon to preserve the balance of powers among the branches of
government, the House, a key component of that balance, should be asked to
aid in the cause. Without House involvement, the legislative branch of
government responds disproportionately to the interests of smaller states, when
the interests of all citizens are at stake.
Expanding the advice and consent role to include the House also comports
with the changing view of the Senate in American government. Initially,
Senators were not chosen by the People, but by state legislatures," 14 and they
were to serve as an aristocratic check upon a populist House of
Representatives." 5 This image of the Senate as privy counsel to the President
110 Id. at 566; cf. DUMAS MALONE, JEFFERSON AND His Tim: THE SAGE OF
MONTICELLO 349 (1981) (noting that Jefferson understood "judicial independence from
popular control" as incongruous with democracy; Jefferson would have preferred direct
election of judges).
111 See generally THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton).
112 See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE I.UAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 16-23 (1962);
Monaghan, supra note 15, at 1203.
113 See supra text accompanying note 109.
114 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3.
115 See generally JAMES L. SUNDQUIST, CONSTITUTIONAL REFoRM AND EFFECrrVE
GOVERNMENT 22-23 (1986); see also THE FEDERALIST No. 62 (Alexander Hamilton or
James Madison); Vik D. Amar, Note, The Senate and the Cons'tution, 97 YALE L.J. 1111,
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in matters such as appointments may at one time have been consistent with the
general view of the Senate in the governmental structure.1 16 As a privy
counsel, removed from the ebbs and flows of public opinion, it would be better
able to aid in the selection of objective decisionmakers who, it was thought-or
hoped-stood aloof on the chill and distant heights of pure reason. But the
notion of the Senate as privy counsel to aid in the selection of such an aloof
judiciary has faded with time. Given the direct election of Senators,1 17 and the
rise of legal realism, it seems high time to reevaluate the special status of the
Senate in Supreme Court appointments.
On a related note, the Senate's special status with regard to treaties, found
in the same section of the Constitution as the Appointments Clause,118 has
diminished somewhat since the nation's founding, with a concomitant rise in
the importance of the House. For the first several decades it was well
understood that all treaties made by the President and approved by the Senate
would, in self-executing fashion, become the law of the land. 119 In the 1829
case of Foster v. Neilson,120 Chief Justice Marshall first suggested that some
treaties are not self-executing but require the input of the House to become
domestically enforceable. 121 Since then, the view that "certain treaties are
inherently non-self-executing because legislative power exists, for example, to
regulate commerce, to define and punish crimes, and to appropriate money," 122
has risen in importance.' 23 Thus, in many treaty matters affecting the interests
of American citizens, the House is viewed as having an increased role. 124
The House may become involved in the advice and consent process with or
without a constitutional amendment. The Senate might merely expand the scope
of advice and consent to involve House input. This might be accomplished by
the Senate establishing a Joint Judiciary Committee to handle hearings, and by
1114, 1118 (1988).
116 See generally SuNDQuiST, supra note 115, at 52-56.
117 See U.S. CONST. amend. XVII (1913).
118 US. CONST. art. 2, § 2.
119 See generally Jordan J. Paust, Self-Executing Treaties, 82 AM. J. INT'L L. 760
(1988).
120 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253 (1829), overruled on other grounds by United States v.
Percheman, 32 U.S. 51 (1833).
121 See Paust, supra note 119, at 766-67.
12 2 I. at 775.
123 For cases and commentary, see id. at 775 n.99.
124 See also Kenneth C. Randall, Foreign Affairs in the Next Century, 91 COLUM. L.
REV. 2097, 2109 (1991) (reviewing Louis HENKIN, CoNsTrruTIONALIsM, DEMOCRACY AND
FOREIGN AFFAius (1990)).
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taking a House floor vote into account before casting its own.
Alternatively, an amendment need only add the words "and the House of
Representatives" to the appropriate clause of Article II, Section 2 of the
Constitution. The amendment might be procedurally implemented as described
above, with the key difference being that the House floor vote would not be
merely advisory, but could constitutionally quash a nomination.
The most ambitious approach would combine a constitutionally legitimized
advice and consent role of the House with a new understanding of the advice
aspect of the role generally. Such a new understanding might involve active
participation by a Joint Judiciary Committee in the screening of candidates.
Though ambitious, this proposal would best implement the goals propounded in
this Essay.
IV.
The appointment process has been much maligned recently, in no small
part due to confusion over what factors may appropriately be considered by the
Senate. Senators feel constrained by custom to avoid overt consideration of a
nominee's ideology, while simultaneously feeling the need to resist attempts by
Presidents to cast their ideological imprints upon the law of the land far in
excess of their terms. The resulting tension is often released by creating shams
to cover what is truly being considered. The result is a sham, and is rightly
maligned.
It is also a shame, because it need not be so. The constraints of custom
may be loosened by a broader view of the history of Supreme Court
nominations. We value precedent, and there is ample precedent for active
consideration of a nominee's ideology. The felt need to resist political power
plays on the part of the President may be acted upon openly and often when the
need is properly viewed to rest upon a constitutional imperative regarding the
basic structure of American government.
Once this tension is thus resolved, however, a new one arises. If the
appointment process is openly political, should we not observe the same rites
we observe with regard to other political acts-namely, review by both the
President and Congress as a whole? Presupposing that Supreme Court Justices
must often step down from chill and distant heights, ought not the House, too,
be privy to decisions affecting the direction of American law? Once it is clear
what we are doing during the appointment process, and why what we are doing
is appropriate, House involvement is clearly warranted to bring further
coherence to the process.
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